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A LOOK WITHIN: EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH AUTHORITY TO ENSURE 
SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES
Peter Van Tuyn*
Valerie Brown**
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses the extent of federal executive branch authority
to manage fisheries in the marine waters of the United States.  The conven-
tional view of this authority is that fisheries are jointly managed by the
National Marine Fisheries Service (Fisheries Service)1 and regional fishery
management councils.  Under this view, the Fisheries Service generally
cannot make fishery management decisions of its own accord.
A review of congressional delegation to the executive branch of fishery
management authority reveals that the executive has greater authority to
manage fisheries than this conventional view allows.  In certain circum-
stances, the executive can act outside the council system to ensure that
commercial fisheries are conducted in a truly sustainable manner.
This Article begins with an explanation of the conventional council-
dominated view of fisheries management.  It then reviews the full scope of
existing federal executive branch authority to manage fisheries and
concludes that authority exists outside the council system for the executive
to manage fisheries.  This authority can be used by the executive to
2 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1
2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (2000).
3. Id. § 1852(a)(1).
4. Id. § 1852(b); JOSH EAGLE ET AL., TAKING STOCK OF THE REGIONAL FISHERY
MANAGEMENT COUNCILS 12-13 (2003).
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h).
6. See, e.g., Fishery Management Plans, NOAA Fisheries, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/
sfa/domes_fish/FMPS.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2008) (listing all Fisheries Management
Plans (FMPs) and illustrating that the vast majority focus on a single-species).  
7. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(1)(A).
8. Id. § 1853(c).
9. Id. § 1854(a).
10. Id. § 1854(a)(3).
complement council-dominated management and may be especially useful
in those situations where the council system proves incapable of making
decisions that ensure the sustainability of the fishery resources of the
United States.
II. THE REGIONAL FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL SYSTEM
The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
(Magnuson Act) provides the legal structure for the current system of
federal fisheries management in the United States.2  Through the Act,
Congress created eight fishery management regions throughout the coastal
United States, each with its own fishery management council.3  The
councils generally are dominated by commercial fishing interests and also
include Fisheries Service officials and representatives from states adjacent
to the regional boundaries.  In addition, they can include other fishing
interests, and, on rare occasions, non-consumptive user representatives.4
The regional councils are charged with crafting fishery management
plans (FMPs) for fisheries within their jurisdiction that require “conserva-
tion and management measures.”5  The FMPs generally focus on a single
fish species,6 contain the “conservation and management” measures for the
fisheries which they cover, including “necessary and appropriate” measures
to “prevent overfishing and rebuild overfished stocks, and to protect, re-
store, and promote the long-term health and stability of the fishery.”7  The
councils propose regulations to implement the FMPs to the Fisheries
Service.8
In turn, the Fisheries Service reviews council-prepared FMPs for
consistency with the Magnuson Act and other laws.9   The Fisheries Service
has the authority to approve, disapprove, or partially approve FMPs.10  If
the Fisheries Service disapproves or partially approves an FMP, the
relevant council is provided an opportunity to submit a revised FMP to the
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11. Id. § 1854(a)(4).  The same process is followed for amendments to FMPs.  See id. §
1854.
12. Id. § 1854(b).
13. Id. § 1854(c).
14. See Monica B. Goldberg, Optimum Yield: A Goal Honored in Breach, in MANAGING
MARINE FISHERIES IN THE UNITED STATES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE PEW OCEANS COMMISSION
WORKSHOP ON MARINE FISHERY MANAGEMENT 14 (2002) (explaining that Fisheries Service
“officials and their defenders sometimes point to the [Magnuson Act’s] provision that the
Secretary of Commerce may only approve, partially approve, or disapprove [FMPs] in order
to support their view that [the Fisheries Service] lacks the power to take proactive
management steps”).
15. Comments and Responses to NMFS Proposed Regulations for Implementing
Essential Fish Habitat Provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 2343, 2349 (Jan. 17, 2002). 
16. Id. at 2349 (emphasis added).  The comment also notes that the Interim Final Rule
to Implement the Essential Fish Habitat Provisions of the Magnuson Act includes similar
language.  Id. (referencing Interim Final Rule to Implement the Essential Fish Habitat
Provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 62 Fed.
Reg. 66,531, 66,532-33 (Dec. 19, 1997)). 
Fisheries Service.11  The Fisheries Service follows a similar process for
council-proposed regulations that implement the FMPs.12  If the Fisheries
Service prepares the FMP, it also prepares the regulations to implement the
FMP.13
III. CONVENTIONAL VIEWS ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES’
FISHERY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Fisheries management in the United States’ exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) is generally, although not exclusively, conducted using the regional
fishery management council process.  In general, the Fisheries Service has
taken the view that any regulation should come through the councils and
the species-based FMPs.14
This dynamic can also be seen in the Fisheries Service essential fish
habitat rulemaking.  Despite the fact that in this rulemaking the Fisheries
Service “embrace[d] [ecosystem] concepts” in the Magnuson Act,15 it put
these concepts into action only by “urg[ing] Councils to seek environmental
sustainability in fishery management, within the current statutorily pre-
scribed fishery management framework (i.e., management by FMPs).”16
Consequently, it appears that the Fisheries Service has taken a narrow
council-limited view of its fishery management authority.  
The focus of the industry-dominated council system on the extractive
use of living marine resources through largely single-species FMPs
minimizes the consideration of larger-scope conservation issues that the
4 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1
17. See, e.g., PAUL DAYTON ET AL., ECOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF FISHING IN MARINE
ECOSYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES 31-32 (2002); see also EAGLE ET AL., supra note 4, at
37-38;  D. L. Allison, Problems with U.S. Ocean Governance and Institutional Structures:
The Impact on Waters, Fish and Fisheries in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone, in
MANAGING MARINE FISHERIES IN THE UNITED STATES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE PEW OCEANS
COMMISSION WORKSHOP ON MARINE FISHERY MANAGEMENT 25 (2003) (“In pursuit of short-
term economic gains, fishery managers have allowed fishing in excess of the levels that can
maintain healthy ecosystems.”).
18. See, e.g., EAGLE ET AL., supra note 4, at 3 (“[T]hirty years of experience with the
council system suggests that reform is now needed.”); DAYTON ET AL., supra note 17, at 31-
32;  U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST  CENTURY
(2005); PEW OCEANS COMMISSION, AMERICA’S LIVING OCEANS, CHARTING A COURSE FOR
SEA CHANGE, A REPORT TO THE NATION 47 (2003).
19. Also known as the U.S. Fish Commission.
20. [I]t shall be the duty of said commissioner to prosecute investigations and
inquiries on the subject, with the view of ascertaining whether any and what
diminution in the number of the food fishes of the coast and the lakes of the United
States has taken place; and, if so, to what causes the same is due; and also whether
any and what protective, prohibitory, or precautionary measures should be adopted
in the premises; and to report upon the same to Congress. 
Magnuson Act was intended to address.17  This has led some commenters
to advocate for substantial reform to the council system.18
IV. GENERAL EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY FOR FISHERY MANAGEMENT
The executive’s authority to manage fisheries is broader than that
exercised to date, and includes the ability to enact policies more generally
applicable than the conservation and management measures processed
through the traditional council FMP system.  This conclusion is based on
a broad historical grant of authority over commercial fisheries that survives
the Magnuson Act of 1976 and the Magnuson Act’s broad grant of
authority to the Secretary within the EEZ.  This Section discusses this
authority, beginning with a historical review of the sources of executive
branch fishery management authority and an examination of how the
judiciary might treat the exercise of such authority.  
A.  Historical Review of Fishery Management Authority
Recognizing the importance of fish and fishing to the United States,
Congress created the Office of the U.S. Commissioner of Fish and Fisheries
in 1871.19  The Act, entitled “Joint Resolution for the Protection and
Preservation of the Food Fishes of the Coast of the United States,” provided
for investigation into the decline of fish numbers and authorized the
adoption of appropriate protective measures.20  The Commission was
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H.R.J. Res. 22, 41st Cong., 16 Stat. 593-94 (1871) (emphasis added).  The executive appears
to have equated authority granted under this law to “adopt[]” protective measures with
“regulating the fishery and cultivating this supply in the interest of conservation.”  U.S.
GOV’T MANUAL 107 (1935).  This provides the basis for the Bureau’s regulation of a number
of fisheries.  See id.
21. In 1913, the Department of Commerce and Labor became the Department of
Commerce. 
22. Reorganization Plan No. III of 1940, 5 Fed. Reg. 2107 (June 30, 1940), reprinted in
5 U.S.C. app. at 78 (2000), and in 54 Stat. 1231 (1941). 
23. Id.   This responsibility for “conservation” over all wildlife resources thus appears
to be vested in the precursor agencies to the NOAA long before the 1956 Fish and Wildlife
Act. Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, ch. 1036, § 2, Pub. L. No. 84-1024, 70 Stat. 1119
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 742a-j (2000)) (placing power in the Bureau of
Commercial Fisheries, which, as detailed below, was then transferred to the Secretary of
Commerce when the Bureau became NOAA Fisheries).  
24. Reorganization Plan No. III of 1940, 5 Fed. Reg. at 2107.
25. Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, § 2. 
26. Id.
27. Id. § 3(c).
transferred to the newly established Department of Commerce and Labor21
and renamed the Bureau of Fisheries in 1903.
In 1939, the Bureau of Fisheries was moved from the Department of
Commerce to the Department of the Interior.  At the same time, the Bureau
of Biological Survey was moved from Agriculture to Interior.  These two
Bureaus became part of the new Fish and Wildlife Service in 1940.22
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s message accompanying the
reorganization noted that this move “concentrated in one department the
two bureaus responsible for the conservation and utilization of the wildlife
resources of the Nation.”23   In addition, President Roosevelt explained that
“[o]n the basis of experience gained since this transfer, [he found] it
necessary and desirable to consolidate these units into a single bureau to be
known as the Fish and Wildlife Service.”24
In 1956, Congress passed the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act,
giving the Secretary of Interior broad authority over the commercial
fisheries of the United States.  The Act noted in the Declaration of Policy
that fish, shellfish, and wildlife resources are capable of being maintained
and greatly increased with proper management.25
The Act identified among the needs of the fishing industry “resource
management to assure the maximum sustainable production for the
fisheries.”26  All functions and responsibilities placed in the “Department
of the Interior or any official thereof by this Act shall be included among
the functions and responsibilities of the Secretary of the Interior, as the
head of the Department.”27  It expressly authorized the Secretary to use
6 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1
28. Id. § 3(f).  
29. Id. § 6(a).
30. Id. § 3(a).  
31. Id. § 3(d)(1).  
32. Id. § 7(a)(5).
33. An Act to Establish a Contiguous Fishery Zone Beyond the Territorial Sea of the
United States, Pub. L. No. 89-658, 80 Stat. 908 (1966).
34. H.R. REP. NO. 94-445, at 26 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 593, 599.    
35. See generally, STRATTON COMMISSION, OUR NATION OF THE SEA: A PLAN FOR
NATIONAL ACTION (1969).
36. The Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife remained in the Department of the
Interior and retained responsibility for managing national wildlife refuges. 16 U.S.C. §
742b(c).
37. Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,627 (Oct. 3, 1970), reprinted in
5 U.S.C. app. at 189 (2000), and in 84 Stat. 2090 (1971);  see also Exec. Order No. 11,564,
35 Fed. Reg. 15,801 (Oct. 6, 1970).
38. But see Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1970, Fed. Reg. at 15,627 (reserving four
express functions that are not relevant here).
“general administrative authority consistently with the terms of this Act as
he shall find necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act effectively
and in the public interest.”28  The Act explicitly captured for the Depart-
ment of the Interior what later became the function of the Secretary of
Commerce, i.e., actions that “relate primarily to the development, advance-
ment, management, conservation, and protection of commercial fisheries.”29
The Department of the Interior divided fisheries duties between the
Bureau of Commercial Fisheries and Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wild-
life.30  The Bureau of Commercial Fisheries was tasked with “those matters
to which this Act applies relating primarily to commercial fisheries, whales,
seals, and sea lions, and related matters.”31  The Secretary was tasked with
taking “such steps as may be required for the development, management,
advancement, conservation, and protection of wildlife resources through
research, acquisition of refuge lands, development of existing facilities, and
other means.”32
In 1966, the United States established a fisheries zone of nine miles
contiguous to its three-mile territorial sea.33  Legislative history for that Act
indicates that from 1966 until March 1, 1977, the United States did not
recognize the right of any coastal nation to regulate fish beyond twelve
miles from its shores.34
In 1969, the Stratton Commission Report, “Our Nation and the Sea”
recommended a new oceanic and atmospheric agency.35  In 1970, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA) was created, and the
functions of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries36 were moved back to the
Department of Commerce.37  All functions38 vested by law in the Bureau of
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39. Id.
40. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (2000).
41. Id. § 1812;  see also id. § 1811 (defining “Fishery Conservation Zone”); but see
Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. L. No. 104-297, 110 Stat. 3559 (1956) (replacing the
original definition of the fishery conservation zone with the definition of the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ), incorporated in the 1983 Presidential Proclamation No. 5030, 48
Fed. Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 10, 1983), declaring the EEZ generally as that area offshore of the
United States from three to 200 miles).
42. 16 U.S.C. § 1855(d). 
Commercial Fisheries of the Department of the Interior or in its Secretary,
along with functions from several other departments, were transferred to
the Secretary of Commerce, where it remains to this day.39
In 1976, the U.S. Congress passed the Magnuson Act to, among other
things, “take immediate action to conserve and manage the fishery
resources found off the coasts of the United States.”40  The Magnuson Act
asserted exclusive fishery management authority “in the manner provided
for in this Act” throughout the “fishery conservation zone.”41  This was a
bold move to drastically extend the same jurisdiction that the United States
had previously claimed out to twelve miles.
The extension of jurisdiction beyond the twelve-mile limit included
fisheries management in areas that were the subject of international dispute,
i.e., the area between the territorial sea boundary and the newly defined
“fishery conservation zone.”  This allowed the United States to set up an
allocation system for dealing with foreign vessels, a system that would give
priority to U.S. fishermen.  
There is no language in the Magnuson Act that restricts or repeals the
previously existing conservation and management authority of the
Secretary of Commerce over commercial fisheries.  Instead, the Act states
as its purpose the need to extend the United State’s fisheries conservation
and management authority out to 200 miles, while at the same time setting
up the Regional Council System to deal with FMPs and allocation of
fisheries’ resources.  The 1996 amendments to the Magnuson Act also
granted the Secretary the unambiguous authority to promulgate regulations
“to carry out any . . . provision of this chapter.”42   In addition, these amend-
ments added provisions dealing with executive authority to protect essential
fish habitat;  some protections which are clearly designed to be implement-
ed outside of the council system.  
The 1996 findings relating to habitat state that:
Certain stocks of fish have declined to the point where their
survival is threatened, and other stocks of fish have been so
substantially reduced in number that they could become similarly
8 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1
43. Id. § 1801(a).
44. Id.
45. Id. 
46. Id. § 1801(b).
47. Id. § 1802(10).
48. Loss of prey may be an adverse effect on [essential fish habitat] and managed
species because the presence of prey makes waters and substrate function as feeding
habitat, and the definition of [essential fish habitat] includes waters and substrate
necessary to fish for feeding. Therefore, actions that reduce the availability of a major
prey species, either through direct harm or capture, or through adverse impacts to the
prey species’ habitat that are known to cause a reduction in the population of the prey
species, may be considered adverse effects on [essential fish habitat] if such actions
reduce the quality of [essential fish habitat]. . . . 
50 C.F.R. § 600.815(a)(7) (2007).
49. 16 U.S.C. § 1853; see also id. § 1855.
50. Id.  § 1855(b)(1)(D)(2).
threatened as a consequence of . . . direct and indirect habitat
losses which have resulted in a diminished capacity to support
existing fishing levels.  A national program for the conservation
and management of the fishery resources of the United States is
necessary to . . . facilitate long-term protection of essential fish
habitats . . . .43
Moreover, the amendments state that “[o]ne of the greatest long-term
threats to the viability of commercial and recreational fisheries is the
continuing loss of marine, estuarine, and other aquatic habitats.”44  Habitat
considerations should receive increased attention for the conservation and
management of fishery resources of the United States.45  Based on these
findings, Congress declared that it was a purpose of the Magnuson Act “to
promote the protection of essential fish habitat in the review of projects
conducted under Federal permits, licenses, or other authorities that affect
or have the potential to affect such habitat.”46
Essential fish habitat and related terms are defined broadly in the
Magnuson Act.  For example, the definition of essential fish habitat
encompasses both “waters and substrate.”47  Adverse effects on essential
fish habitat are also broadly defined, and include the loss of prey.48
As one way of protecting habitat, Congress directed the Fisheries
Service and the councils, through the FMP process, to describe and identify
essential fish habitat in FMPs, and to minimize impacts on such habitat
caused by fishing.49  Congress also established a consultation process for
the Fisheries Service to review non-fishing impacts to essential fish habitat
from federal action.50  At the same time, Congress provided that  “[t]he
Secretary shall review programs administered by the Department of
2008] Executive Authority to Ensure Sustainable Fisheries 9
51. Id. § 1855(b)(1)(C).
52. United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (providing
that plain and unambiguous statutory language is to be followed).
53. Id. § 1855(d). 
54. Mourning v. Family Publ’ns Servs., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973) (footnotes and
citations omitted). 
55. 16 U.S.C. § 1855(b)(1)(B).
Commerce and ensure that any relevant programs further the conservation
and enhancement of essential fish habitat.”51  This granted broad authority
to the Secretary to ensure conservation and enhancement of essential fish
habitat.
The plain meaning of this provision does not qualify the Secretary’s
ability to take action on Commerce Department programs that impact
essential fish habitat.  Indeed, the plain language, including the terms
“shall” and “ensure,” mandates that the Secretary do so.52
Further, as noted above, the Secretary is empowered to promulgate
regulations “to carry out any . . . provision of this chapter.”53  The law is
clear that: 
Where the empowering provision of a statute states simply that the
agency may “make . . . such rules and regulations as may be neces-
sary to carry out the provisions of this Act,” . . . the validity of a
regulation promulgated thereunder will be sustained so long as it
is “reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation.”54
Consequently, as fishery management is a Department of Commerce
program, authority appears to exist for the Secretary to act unilaterally to
protect essential fish habitat.
Despite the seemingly clear grant of authority by  this provision and the
general regulatory authority conferred by Congress, there is some tension
between sections 1855(d) and 1855(b)(1)(B).  Section 1855(b)(1)(B)
provides that:
The Secretary, in consultation with participants in the fishery, shall
provide each Council with recommendations and information
regarding each fishery under that Council’s authority to assist it in
the identification of EFH, the adverse impacts on that habitat, and
the actions that should be considered to ensure the conservation
and enhancement of that habitat.55
This section suggests that the Secretary’s ability to influence fishing-related
impacts on essential fish habitat provisions must be done through the
councils.
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56. Id.
57. Note that the interpretation espoused here does create a distinction in authority
between Department of Commerce programs (where authority would be broad) and other
federal agencies (where authority would be consultative).  
58. See S. REP. NO. 104-276, at 24-25 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4073,
4097-98; H.R. REP. NO. 104-171, at 34-35 (1995).
59. Successful use of the broad essential fish habitat authority to take a precautionary
approach is predicated on the definition of essential fish habitat, which is a council-specific
action.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1853(a)(7), 1855(b)(1)(A).  Consequently, the council system is still
important to defining the portal through which this authority could be used by the Secretary.
60. H.R.J. Res. 22, 41st Cong., 16 Stat. 593-94 (1871).  
61. Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, ch. 1036, § 3(f), Pub. L. No. 84-1024, 70 Stat. 1119,
1112 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 742a-j (2000)). 
Although sections 1855(d) and 1855(b)(1)(B) appear inconsistent, the
former has a program-wide focus, while the latter is fishery specific.  For
example, if the Secretary has fishery-specific concerns, she must go
through the normal council process.  If, however, the Secretary has
program-wide essential fish habitat fishery management concerns under the
Magnuson Act, then she has authority to act unilaterally to ensure that all
fishery management programs “further the conservation and enhancement
of essential fish habitat.”56
This latter interpretation is supported by the absence of any qualifica-
tions regarding the application of essential fish habitat provisions to
specific Commerce Department programs.  The section merely states that
“The Secretary shall review programs administered by the Department of
Commerce,” and does not include a qualifier such as “non-fishing-related
programs,” or the simpler “other programs.”57  The Senate and House
Reports providing legislative history on section 1855(b) do not expand on
the meaning of this provision,58 and no cases to date have directly dealt
with it.59
B. Analysis of the Extent of General Secretarial 
Authority to Manage Fisheries
To summarize, in 1871, Congress gave the executive authority to
determine “whether any and what protective, prohibitory, or precautionary
measures should be adopted” to protect the numbers of fish.60  In the 1956
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, Congress expressly delegated general
administrative authority to the Secretary to be used “consistently with the
terms of this Act as he shall find necessary to carry out the provisions of
this Act effectively and in the public interest.”61  The Bureau of Fisheries
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62. Id. § 2(3)(c).
63. 16 U.S.C. § 1801.
64. Compare 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801(b)(1)-(2), with Fish and Wildlife Act § 3 (addressing
scope of authority to manage fish) and Act of Oct. 14, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-658, 80 Stat.
908 (1966) (establishing a contiguous fishery zone beyond the territorial sea of the United
States).
65. See 16 U.S.C. § 1855(d).
66. The law disfavors a conclusion that the Magnuson Act repealed authority the
Secretary of Commerce had in 1976:  “It is a cardinal principle of construction that repeals
by implication are not favored.”  United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939);
see, e.g., Nigg v. U.S. Postal Serv., 501 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th  Cir. 2007) (stating that repeal
by implication is disfavored and that “the intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear
and manifest”) (internal quotations omitted).  Absent clear intent, an implied partial repeal
will be found only in the face of an “irreconcilable conflict,”  Estate of Bell v. Comm’r,  928
F.2d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 1991) (quotation marks omitted), or “clear repugnancy,”  United
States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988), or undue interference.  Radzanower v. Touche
Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 156 (1976).  Such conflict or repugnancy does not exist here.
was, in part, tasked with “resource management to assure the maximum
sustainable production for the fisheries.”62
Executive branch reorganization moved these functions to the Fisheries
Service, and no later executive or congressional act modified these
authorities.  One possible exception, however, is the 1976 Magnuson Act,
through which Congress exerted exclusive fishery conservation and
management authority over a wide swath of ocean along the United States
coasts and provided that it shall be exercised “in the manner provided for
in this Act.”63  Through the Magnuson Act, it appears that the Act actually
took the Secretary’s existing authority, and extended it to new areas for the
Secretary to regulate.  Thus, the Secretary has broader authority over
marine conservation than has been exercised in the past.
As an initial matter, it would appear that the only potentially qualifying
language in the Magnuson Act—“in the manner provided for in this
Act”—does not serve to limit previous authority of the Secretary.  This is
because other provisions of the Magnuson Act support the continued grant
of broad secretarial authority.  For example, the purposes of the Magnuson
Act are stated broadly and in a manner consistent with previous laws.64
Furthermore, while the Magnuson Act has a large focus on the council-
Fisheries Service management plan system, it also provides that the
“responsibility of [the] Secretary” goes beyond FMP-related actions, such
as promulgating regulations to implement FMPs.65  Finally, even if one
were to conclude that the 1976 law implicitly repealed the previous scope
of the Secretary’s authority,66 Congress gave that authority back in 1996
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67. 16 U.S.C. § 1855(d).
68. Exec. Order No. 13,449, 72 Fed. Reg. 60,531 (Oct. 20, 2007) (referencing, among
other laws, Magnuson Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, the Atlantic
Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act, and the Atlantic Striped Bass Conservation
Act). 
69. Id.
70. OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, ADMINISTRATION OF CORAL REEF RESOURCES IN THE
NORTHWEST HAWAIIAN ISLANDS  (2000), http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/coralreef.htm (last visited
Nov. 12, 2008).  
71. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447 (1987) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A. Inc.,
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)).
when it added language that gave the Secretary the authority to “carry out
any other provision of this chapter.”67
C.  Presidential Actions on Marine Conservation
President George W. Bush issued an executive order ending the com-
mercial catch of striped bass and red drum in federal waters.68   He based
this executive order on general authority derived from “the Constitution
and the laws of the United States of America.”69  This general authority
also exists for the President to use similarly broad authority for other
fishery policy actions.
In an analysis of presidential action, the Office of Legal Council has
also addressed the extent of executive authority over the EEZ.  It concluded
that the United States has sufficient “control” over the EEZ for the
President to invoke the Antiquities Act for the purposes of protecting the
marine environment.70  Thus, the President, through exercise of executive
authority that is derived separately from the Magnuson Act, may take broad
conservation actions in the EEZ.
D.  Judicial Review of the Secretary’s Ability to Exert Broad Authority
The discussion above indicates that Congress has granted the Secretary
authority to manage fisheries beyond the limitations of the council system.
At the same time, the judiciary is the final arbiter on issues of statutory
construction,71 and an exertion of broad authority that bypasses the council
system could be subject to legal challenge.  Therefore, in deciding whether
such authority exists, it is appropriate to consider how a court would
address the issue.
The judiciary must reject administrative constructions that are contrary
to clear congressional intent: “If a court, employing traditional tools of
statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the
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75. Id.
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precise question at issue, that intention is law and must be given effect.”72
When congressional intent is not clear, the judiciary’s review of an
administrative construction is much more deferential: “where the ‘statute
is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute.’”73  As the U.S. Supreme Court more recently put it in United
States v. Mead, when Congress has “explicitly left a gap for an agency to
fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a
specific provision of the statute by regulation, and any ensuing regulation
is binding in the courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or
capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”74  The Court
has “long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an
executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer . . . .”75  Additionally, the “fair measure of deference to an
agency administering its own statute has been understood to vary with
circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency’s care,
its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness
of the agency’s position.”76  The approach has produced a spectrum of
judicial responses, from great respect at one end to near indifference at the
other.77
The Mead Court also summed up the deference due to an agency, even
if the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit:
Congress . . . may not have expressly delegated authority or
responsibility to implement a particular provision or fill a parti-
cular gap. Yet it can still be apparent from the agency’s generally
conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that
Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the
force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a
space in the enacted law, even one about which Congress did not
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actually have an intent as to a particular result.  When circum-
stances implying such an expectation exist, a reviewing court has
no business rejecting an agency’s exercise of its generally con-
ferred authority to resolve a particular statutory ambiguity simply
because the agency’s chosen resolution seems unwise, but is
obliged to accept the agency’s position if Congress has not pre-
viously spoken to the point at issue and the agency’s interpretation
is reasonable.78
Consistency of agency interpretation is a factor in determining the
degree of deference owed to an agency’s exercise of authority.  The
Secretary is not disqualified from changing interpretations.  When this
happens, “the courts still sit in review of the administrative decision and
should not approach the statutory construction issue de novo and without
regard to the administrative understanding of the statutes.”79  At the same
time, “[a]n agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts
with the agency’s earlier interpretation is ‘entitled to considerably less
deference’ than a consistently held agency view.”80  When an agency’s
position shifts, courts must consider the facts of individual cases in
deciding how much weight should be attributed to the agency’s views.81
As applied here, and with the caveat that the facts of specific circum-
stances are critical to understand and evaluate, an action by the executive
to ensure that fisheries are managed in a sustainable manner could survive
judicial scrutiny.  As an initial matter, as the discussion above addresses,
the historical grant of authority is clear for the executive to manage
fisheries in a precautionary and sustainable manner.82  This authority has
not been superseded by any act of Congress since those early grants of
authority, and indeed has actually been advanced.83  Furthermore, there are
no clear expressions of congressional intent to the contrary.84
The tension discussed above between two essential fish habitat-related
provisions in the Magnuson Act—one of which appears to provide authority
to the executive to act unilaterally to protect essential fish habitat, and another
which appears to limit the exercise of this authority to action taken through
the council system—may be seen as introducing some ambiguity into the
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statutory language.85  Yet, strictly read, section 1855(b)(1)(B) only con-
cerns fishery-specific impacts on essential fish habitat.  So long as the
executive recognizes and does nothing contrary to this limitation, there will
be no tension between statutory sections.  Additionally, as fishery-specific
actions to protect essential fish habitat are only a subset of possible pre-
cautionary marine conservation-related actions that could be taken by the
executive, it is also not a meaningful limitation on executive authority in
this area.
The broad grant of authority to conserve fisheries is clear.  The
Fisheries Service’s historical interpretation of its authority, as generally
limited to actions taken through the council system, should not present a
roadblock to executive action.86  So long as the executive’s action is based
on existing authority, a court should not interfere.87
V. CONCLUSION
General authority exists for the executive branch to implement fishery
conservation and management measures in federal waters independent of
the council process.  This authority stems from the original broad grant of
authority from Congress to the executive; authority which was reinforced
and advanced through subsequent congressional action regarding fishery
conservation and management.  Consequently, should the executive find
that circumstances exist that are anathema to a sustainable interaction
between fishing and the marine environment, it generally can act indepen-
dently of the regional fishery management council system to redress that
situation.
